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Equality and Monodic First-Order Temporal Logic
Anatoli Degtyarev, Michael Fisher, and Alexei Lisitsa
Logic and Computation Group, Department of Computer Science
University of Liverpool, Liverpool L69 7ZF, U.K.
 A.Degtyarev,M.Fisher,A.Lisitsa@csc.liv.ac.uk
Abstract. It has been shown recently that monodic first-order temporal logic
without functional symbols but with equality is incomplete, i.e. the set of the valid
formulae of this logic is not recursively enumerable. In this paper we show that
an even simpler fragment consisting of monodic monadic two-variable formulae
is not recursively enumerable.
1 Introduction
It has been known for a long time that first-order temporal logic over the natural num-
bers is incomplete [Sza86, SH88]. Thus, there is no finitary inference system which is
sound and complete for the logic1, or equivalently, the set of valid formulae of the logic
is not recursively enumerable. Recently, the interesting monodic fragment of first-order
temporal logic has been investigated [HWZ00], which has a quite transparent (and intu-
itive) syntactic definition and a finite inference system [WZ01]. Moreover many impor-
tant subfragments of the monodic fragment turn out to be decidable [HWZ00, WZ01].
Unfortunately, all the positive properties of the monodic fragment concerning complete-
ness and decidability hold only for the logic without equality. For example, in [WZ01] it
was shown that the set of valid monodic formulae becomes not recursively enumerable
after adding equality. However, the given proof left open some questions concerning the
minimum requirements of the monodic language with equality necessary for obtaining
incompleteness. Related questions concerning what will happen with decidable frag-
ments of monodic first-order temporal logic, such as monadic or two-variable varieties,
once equipped with equality, have also been left open in [HWZ00] and [WZ01].
Below we prove that even the intersection of monodic monadic and two-variable
fragments becomes not recursively enumerable once equality is added.
The language   of the first-order temporal logic over the natural numbers is con-
structed in the standard way (see, for example, [Fis97, HWZ00]) from a classical (non-
temporal) first-order language  (with equality but without functional symbols) and a
set of future-time temporal operators ‘ ’ (sometime), ‘ ’ (always), ‘  ’ (in the next
moment), ‘ ’(until).
Formulae in   are interpreted in first-order temporal structures of the form   
    where   is a non-empty set, the domain of , and  is a function associating,
with every moment of time    , an interpretation of predicate and constant symbols
of  over  . First-order (non-temporal) structures corresponding to each point of time
1 However there are complete infinitary systems with  -type rules [Kaw87, Sza87, Sza95].
 will be denoted by  
 
    . Intuitively, the interpretations of  -formulae
are sequences of first-order structures, or states of  , such as  
 
 

     
 
   
An assignment in   is a function  from the set 
 
of individual variables of  to
 . If  is a predicate symbol then     (or simply    if  is understood) is the
interpretation of  in the state 
 
. We require that (individual) variables and constants
of   are rigid, that is neither assignments nor interpretations of constants depend on
the state in which they are evaluated.
The truth-relation  
 
 
 
 (or simply     , if   is understood ) in the
structure   for the assignment  is defined inductively in the usual way under the
following semantics of temporal operators:
  
 
 
 iff      
  
 
  iff there exists a  	  such that     
  
 
 iff      for all  	 
  
 
  iff there exists a  	  such that      and
for every 	   if  
 	 
  then 	    
A formula  is said to be satisfiable if there is a first-order structure  and an assign-
ment  such that 
 
 
 
. If 
 
 
 
 for every structure  and for all assignments
 then  is said to be valid. Note that formulae here are interpreted in the initial state
 
 
; this is an alternative, but equivalent, definition to the one used in [HWZ00]. Let
 be the set of all valid  -formulae, and  be the set of all valid  -formulae
without equality.
Following [HWZ00] we consider the set of all  -formulae  such that any sub-
formula of  of the form  , ,  , 

 

has at most one free variable. Such
formulae are called monodic, and the set of monodic -formulae is denoted by  

. It
was shown in [WZ01] that the set    

is not recursively enumerable, while for
the set    

a finite Hilbert-style axiomatization has been provided.
It is reasonable to consider natural restrictions of  

corresponding to well-known
fragments of the classical first-order language  such as monadic, two-variable and
guarded fragments [HWZ00, WZ01]. Let  

,  


and  

denote monadic, two-
variable and guarded fragments of  

, respectively. Let us recall that  

consists
of all  

-formulae containing only unary predicates and propositional symbols, and
 


contains all  

-formulae with at most two variables. It was proved in [HWZ00]
that each of the sets    

, 

  


and    

is decidable. Below
we show that, after introducing equality, the sets    

and    

, together
with their intersection    

  


, become not even partially decidable, i.e.
not recursively enumerable. Our proof is based on the argument that Minsky machines
[Min67] can be simulated by formulae of  

  


. As to the guarded fragment
   


the question of its decidability/enumerability remains open.
2 Minsky machines
The (two-counter) Minsky machine represents a universal model of computation [Min61,
Min67]. Being of very simple structure, Minsky machines are very convenient for prov-
ing undecidability results (see for example [Hu¨t94, KR95, CZ97, GMV99]).
A Minsky machine  is a simple imperative program consisting of a sequence of
instructions labelled by natural numbers from  to some . It starts from an instruction
labelled  and operates with two counters 

and 

each containing a nonnegative
integer. Any instruction is one of the following forms:
: ADD  to 

; GOTO ;
: IF 

  	 THEN SUBTRACT  FROM 

; GOTO  ELSE GOTO ;
: STOP.
where 	   
 and          .
Without loss of generality one can suppose that every machine contains exactly one
instruction of the form : STOP which is the last one (   ). It should be clear that the
execution process (run) is deterministic and has no failure. Any such process is either
finished by the execution of the STOP instruction or lasts forever.
As a consequence of the universality of such computational model the halting prob-
lem for Minsky machines is undecidable:
Theorem 1 ([Min67]). It is undecidable whether a two-counter Minsky machine halts
when both counters initially contain 	.
We will use the following consequence of Theorem 1.
Corollary 1. The set of all Minsky machines which begin with both counters containing
	 and do not halt is not recursively enumerable.
Given any machine (with initial values for the two counters) let us define its run 
as a sequence of triples, or states of :


 
 

 
 

 

 


 


     

 


 


   
where 

is the label of the instruction to be executed at th step of computation,  

and



are the nonnegative integers within the first and the second counters, respectively,
after completion of th step of computation. Depending on whether stops or not 
can be finite or infinite.
Henceforth we will consider only the computations of the Minsky machines started
with both counters containing 	. Thus we always put  

  	, 
 

  	 and 

  .
3 The reduction to the monodic monadic fragment
Given a Minsky machine  defined by the sequence of instructions 

     

we
define a first-order temporal formula  as follows.
Let 

and 

be unary predicate symbols. The intention is to model the contents
of counters 

and 

during the computation by cardinalities of the extensions of 

and 

, respectively, evolving in a temporal structure   . Here the extension (or the
truth domain) of 

at a moment  is    

       
  

   true, 	    

Let 

     

be propositional symbols corresponding to instructions 

     

.
Since we assume 

is the STOP instruction we will denote 

alternatively as 
	
.
Then, for every instruction 


, except : STOP, we define its translation 


 as
follows:
A. An instruction of the form
: ADD  to 

; GOTO 
is translated into the conjuction of the following formulae:
A1. 


 




A2. 


 

 

  

  

    
A3. 


 

 


A4. 


 




A5. 





 

Formulae A1–A4 ensure that in every temporal model  for them, once we have   


 
true at a moment , at the next moment the extension of 

should increase by one
element, while the extension of 

should be the same , i.e.    

  
 

  

 

  
 

 	    
. The formula A5 describes switching truth values of
propositions 

(      ), and the aim here is to model the transition from the
instruction which is executed to the next one.
B. An instruction of the form
: IF 

  	 THEN SUBTRACT  FROM 

GOTO  ELSE GOTO 
is translated into the conjunction of the following formulae:
B1. 


 

 

 


B2. 




 







    
B3. 


 

 

  


B4. 


 

 




B5. 


 

 



  




B6. 


 




 

B7. 


 




  

Formulae B1–B4 ensure that, in every temporal model for them, once we have 


and


 true at some state, in the next state the extension of 

should shrink by one
element and the extension of 

should remain the same. Formula B5 ensures that,
when 


and 

 holds, then, in the next state, the extensions of both 

and 

should remain the same. Formulae B6 and B7 regulate the switching of truth values of


(     ).
Denote by  the formula 
 




 







 


, stating that at
every moment of time precisely one of 

is true.
Further, let the formula 
 
be 

   

  

 and let  be





 where  is a Minsky machine defined by the sequence of instructions


     

.
The formula 
 
 
 is intended to faithfully describe the computation of the
machine and the following lemma provides a formal justification for this.
Lemma 1. A Minsky machine  produces an infinite run if, and only if, 
 
 

 

	
.
Proof
 Let a machine produce an infinite run


  

 
 

 
 

 

 


 


    

 


 


   
and a temporal structure        be a model of 
 
 

. We show by induction
on steps in  that, for all  	 , the following relation between states of  and  
holds:


   whenever      


;



  


;



  


.
For the base case, we have 	   

and the label of the first instruction of  to be
executed is 

  , extensions of both 

and 

are empty and values  

and  

of
both counters at the beginning are 	. This establishes the base case.
For the step case assume for some  that      


, 

  , 


  


, 


  


.
Since the run  is infinite, the instruction 


can be either of the first form, or of the
second, but not the STOP instruction.
If an instruction is of the first form, i.e : ADD  to 

; GOTO , then we have


  

, 


  


 and 

  


. Since the structure  is a model of
 


and, in particular, a model of the translation of 


, we have  

  


  for some
  


, 


  


and    


  . It follows that 

  

, 


  


,



  


, as required.
The case of an instruction of the second form is considered in the same way, and
translation of the instruction again ensures that the extensions of 

, 

and the truth
values of 

in the temporal structure   model the values of counters and labels of
current instruction, as above.
Thus, the step case is also established.
Since the run  is infinite we have 

   for all  	 , and therefore    
	
for all  	 	. Hence, 	   
	
.
 By contraposition it is sufficient to show that if a machine produces a finite run
(halts) then 
 
 

  
	
is satisfiable.
Let a machine,, halt and produce a finite run    

 
 

 
 

    

 


 


,
 	 	. The final executed instruction is the STOP instruction, so we have 

  .
Now, we construct a temporal structure 
 
     as follows. We let the domain
  be a countable set. Then, for all  
  
  , we ensure      


whenever


  , and      
	
for all    . Further, we set   

  
 

  , and for all
 
  
  define  

and  

inductively as follows:
– If the instruction with the label 

is of the first form (ADD) then define  

 



  where  is any element of   such that    

, and  

  


;
– If the instruction with label 

is of the second form (SUBTRACT) and     


 then define  

  


 , where  is any element of   such that
  


, and  

  


;
– If the instruction with the label 

is of the second form (SUBTRACT) and   


 then  

  


and  

  


.
Finally, assume  

and  

to be arbitrary for all   .
It is easily seen that this overall construction provides a model for 
 
 
 and since


   one also has    
	
. Thus, 
 
 

  
	
is satisfied in .
Theorem 2. The set    

  


consisting of all formulae of the monodic
monadic two-variable fragment of first-order temporal logic with equality valid in tem-
poral structures over the natural numbers is not recursively enumerable.
Proof We note that the formulae of the form 
 
 

 
	
belong to  
 


  


. Hence, the statement follows from Theorem 1 and Lemma 1.
4 Conclusion
In [WZ01] it is shown that the monodic fragment with equality is not recursively enu-
merable. At the same time the question of what occurs within the decidable monodic
fragments of first-order temporal logic found in [HWZ00] after extending the language
with equality is left open. In this paper we have shown that the monodic monadic two-
variable fragment with equality is not recursively enumerable. Let us note that, in clas-
sical first-order logic, adding equality to monadic or two-variable fragments does not
destroy their decidability [BGG97].
The proof of incompleteness of the monodic fragment with equality given in [WZ01]
was based on the reduction to Craig’s [Cra50] and Trakhtenbrot’s [Tra50] result about
incompleteness of the set of all first-order formulae valid in all finite interpretations.
Roughly speaking, a formula   of first-order temporal logic with equality was pre-
sented characterizing finite sets, and having this formula it was shown that the set of
temporal formulae     , where  is arbitrary classical first-order formula, is
not recursively enumerable. The formula    , similar to our formula 
 
 

, is
at once monodic, monadic and two-variable. However in [WZ01] there were no con-
straints related to . In our case a very simple temporal formula took the place of  due
to immediate simulation of Minsky machines. Taking into account further results on
Trakhtenbrot’s theorem (e.g. [Vua60]) it seems to be possible to restrict  such that it
would contain, besides monadic predicates, only one binary predicate. In such a way it
would be possible to extend the proof of incompleteness of monodic logic with equality
to the two-variable fragment, but not to the monadic case.
Let us note that there is a simpler temporal formula characterizing finite sets which
is monodic, monadic and two-variable at the same time. We represent this by the con-
junction of two formulae
          

   
 
   
where  is a constant which can be replaced by the outermost existential quantifier. The
first formula tells that, at any time point, there is at most one element of the domain for
which the predicate  holds true. The second formula tells us that   is true at the
initial moment, there is another time point where   has again to be true, and in the
meantime, at successive time points, the predicate has to be true for all other elements
of the domain. As distances between time points are finite, the domain of any model
must be finite as well. This formula is obtained from the formula without predicate
symbols but with a flexible variable given in [Sza95] after replacing the flexible variable
by a (flexible) monadic predicate symbol.2
Another interesting and important monodic fragment, for which decidability with-
out equality was proved in [HWZ00], is the guarded fragment. Unfortunately neither
  
 nor 
 
 
 nor the new formula given above are guarded. So, the question
about decidability/enumerability of the monodic and guarded fragment with equality is
open as before.
Related papers dealing with undecidable guarded fragments of non-temporal first-
order logic with added transitive relations are [GMV99] and [Gra¨99]. In [Gra¨99] it
is shown that the three-variable guarded fragment equipped with two transitive binary
relations is not recursively enumerable, while in [GMV99] the authors have shown that
the two-variable guarded fragment without equality, but equipped with five transitive
relations (or, with equality and four transitive relations), also becomes non recursively
enumerable. (In the first article Trakhtenbrot’s theorem is used, in the second article
encoding Minsky machines has been applied.) On the other hand, the guarded non-
temporal fragment with equality but without any additional relations is still decidable
[AvBN96, AvBN98, Gra¨99, GdN99]. Thus, the case of the temporal monodic guarded
fragment with equality can be seen as falling somewhere in between because after a
standard translation into two-sorted first-order logic (see, e.g., [Aba89, HWZ00]) we
obtain a syntactically restricted fragment with equality and with one linear order on
natural numbers.
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